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required; and the point is fully decided in the negative; as ruled
in Dwyer V-2. Collins, "The only possible object of a notice to produce a certain tine beforehand, is 'to enable the opposite party to
be prepared, either to support or impeach the instrument," as laid
down by Mr. Starkie. Now this is precisely what the party calling
for it is not bound to do; and it was held by the Court that Mr.
Starkie's principle is without authority, and that it is sufficient to
give notice to produce, even in Court, if the document be there;
and if not, as short a time previously as will suffice to bring it.
J. 0. S.
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Circuit Court of the United States, First Circuit, .Rhode

I8land District.
ALKXAD.ER'T. STEWART ET Al. VS. GIDEON L. SPENCER ET AL. 1
1. An assignment for the benefit of Creditors, made by a Debtor who has absconded
to a foreign country, carrying with him a large sum of money, is fraudulent and
void as to Creditors, if it contain a stipulation for a release as a condition of obtaining a preference under the assignment.
2. Whether an insolvent Debtor who assigns but a part of his property for the benefit
of all his Creditors, can ever stipulate for a release. Quwre.

This was a Bill in Equity, brought by certain judgment creditors
of a mercantile firm of Horton & Brother, of the City of Providence,
against Gideon L. Spencer and Thomas Pierce, Jr., and others, to
set aside an assignment:of property made by Horton & Brother,
for the benefit of their creditors. As the decision turned in part on
the particular terms of the Deed, its substance is here given.
"Know all men by these presents: That we, Theodore Horton and
Ferdenand Horton, both of the city and County of Providence,
State of Rhode Island, copartners in trade under the name and
style of Horton & Brother, in consideration of the trusts and proI We publish this opinion at the suggestion of several members of the Rhode
Island Bar.
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visions hereinafter declared and made for the benefit of the creditors
of said firm, and of one dollar to us paid by Gideon L. Spencer, of
North Providence, and Thomas Pierce, Jr., of Providence, do by
these presents, give, grant, bargain, sell, assign, set over and convey unto them, the said Spencer & Pierce, their heirs, executors,
daministrators and assigns, all our right, title and interest, &c.,
[describing the property.] In special trust, however, for the uses
and purposes following, to wit : In trust that they shall, as soon
as reasonably it can be done, make sale at public auction or otherwise, of the goods, chattels and real estate aforesaid, and so far as
practicable, make collection of the claims and demands aforesaid,
and the proceeds of such sales and collections after defraying therefrom the expenses incident to the making of this assignment, and
the executing of the trusts herein declared, including herein a
reasonable compensation for their services, they shall apply and
appropriate in the manner and in the order following, to wit:
First.-They shall, out of said proceeds, pay in full, if said procoeds be sufficient, otherwise ratably, the just claims now holden
against us by the persons, firms and companies following, namely:
The Providence Dyeing, Bleaching, and Calendering Co., &c.,
[specifying certain proved creditors.]
Second.-They shall pay out of the residue of said proceeds in
full, if sufficient, otherwise ratably, the just demands of all those
creditors of the firm of Horton & Brother, who shall, within four
months from the date hereof, present to our assignees their claims,
with satisfactory proofs of correctness, and execute and deliver for
us a release or releases of their respective claims against the undersigned. And
Third.-They shall divide and distribute the residue of said
proceeds, if any there be, after making payments as above ordered,
ratably and in proportion to their respective claims, among those
of our creditors who shall, within eight months from the date
hereof, present to our assignees their claims, with satisfactory
proofs of correctness. And we do hereby severally and jointly constitute and appoint the said Spencer and said Pierce our attorneys,
with full power and authority, for us and in our names to do and
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perform all acts proper and necessary in the executing of the trusts
herein declared."
The general allegation in the bill was, that this assignment was
fraudulent and void as against the creditors of Horton & Brother;
and the Plaintiffs pray that this obstruction to the levy of their
executions may be removed by a Decree of the Court, declaring it
to be void as to creditors, and requiring it to be delivered up to be
cancelled. The residue of the facts appear in the opinion of the
Court, which was delivered by
CuRTIS, J.-The first question is, whether this Deed of assign-

ment is fraudulent and void as to creditors.

In deciding it, not

merely the terms of the Deed itself, but all extraneous facts which
have a bearing on the legal result, must be taken into view. A con-

veyance made by an insolvent debtor may be fraudulent on its face,
containing provisions which the law deems necessarily, and under
all circumstances, fraudulent in their operation; or it may be void
as against creditors solely by reason of matter dehors. the Deed,
from a want of consideration, or of good faith; or it may have the

effect to defeat or delay creditors by reason of some provisions in
the Deed, operating in connection with particular states of fact
shown to exist out of the Deed, though the same provision, in a
Deed, not connected with such other extraneous facts, would not
hinder or delay creditors, and so would not render the Deed invalid.
Before looking into the Deed itself, theiefore, it is necessary to
ascertain the state of facts which accompanied its execution, and

upon which it was intended to, and niust operate.
These faces are, that Horton & Brother, in August, September
and October, 1850, generally under representations that they were.
worth forty thousand dollars over and beyond enough to pay their
debts, obtained credit for merchandise to the extent of upwards of
sixty-two thousand dollars; that on the 4th day of December, 1850,
without any just cause, they stopped payment; that from that time
down to the eighth day of March, 1851, when the assignment was
made, no considerable amount of their debts having come to maturity, so that they could be proceeded against at law, they continued
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to make large sales, and thereby realized in money a very large
sum, shown by the proof to be nearly, if not quite, fifty thousand
dollars; that they ceased to keep a bank account, and retained the
proceeds of their sales in their own possession ; that they made
proposals to their creditors to compromise with them, but these proposals the creditors refused to entertain, except upon condition of
first examining their books, which was declined; that one of them
professed to friends, and probably entertained apprehensions that
he might be proceeded against criminally for fraud in obtaining
credit, and was in feeble health, and through Spencer, one of the
assignees, made inquiries respecting a place of refuge from his
creditors, and through the same agency, arrangements were made
which resulted in the flight presently to be mentioned. On the
evening of Saturday, the eighth day of March, they executed the
Deed of assignment, which by previous concert between them and
the assignees, was not delivered until the next Monday morning,
and immediately after twelve o'clock of the night of Saturday, they
left Providence secretly, got on board a vessel in the Bay bound for
Cuba, going under feigned names, conveying with them the money
they had received from the sales of their merchandise and other
property, and have not since returned; both the assignees knew,
when they agreed to accept the assignment, that the Hortons were
about to leave the State, and when they did accept it, they knew they
had left, and had good reasons to believe they had sailed for Cuba.
They had also good reason to believe they had carried away money;
but how much they were not informed, until by subsequent investigation they ascertained the extent of their sales, and that no money,
and no considerable amount of debts receivable were left behind.
The property assigned is not sufficient to pay their debts; but if
their whole property had been honestly appropriated to this purpose, it would have been sufficient to pay every creditor in full.
Such were the facts which surrounded this Deed, and upon which
it was designed to operate.
The first feature in this Deed requiring notice, is the clause
which secures a preference to those creditors who should release
the assignors within four months. There can be no doubt respect-
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ing the intention with which this clause was inserted, or the object
which it was calculated to effect. 'Its design was to induce creditors to release them, and it was adapted to produce this effect by
holding out the expectation of securing a larger dividend, or payment in full, by compliance with this condition. The question is,
whether a debtor, who has absconded fr6m the country, carrying
with h m a very large sum of money, has a right so to frame a
conveyance of the residue of his property, as to secure to himself
a chance of .a release. To determine this question, it would seem
only to be necessary to consider what the object is which such a
debtor is attempting to reach, and what are the means by which he
endeavors to reach it. , That object is the permanent and final
withdrawal from his creditors of the money he has fraudulently carried away with him, and the safe and effectual reservation of it to
his own use. And the means of accomplishing this object are, to
marshal the residue of his property, and by means of it, to create
inducements to creditors to give their assent to his unjust design.,
Now it may be admitted that a debtor has a legal right to pay
one creditor in preference to another, when he cannot pay both,
and consequently that he may make preferences in assignment of
property made for the benefit of creditors. I think also, it must
be taken to be settled law for' this case, that a debtor may stipulate
for a release, by which his future earnings will be discharged.
(Braskiervs. West, 7 Peters, 608; Halsey vs. -Whitney, 4 Mason,
218.) But it would be "asinconsistent with natural right, as with
the principles of the common law, and the express language of the
13 Eliz. Ch. 5, re-enacted in Rhode Island, to hold, that however
innocent a stipulation for a release may be in itself, and under
many circumstances, yet, if it be designed to be an instrument of
fraud, and calculated to enable the debtor to withdraw from his
creditors what it is his legal and moral duty to pay them, such a
Deed can stand. The object itself is an unlawful 'one, and taints
with fraud, any means, however innocent in themselves, which are
laid hold of to accomplish it.
A debtor who can pay in full, but who forms the fraudulent
design. to pay but a part of his debts, and keep the residue of his
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property to his own use, and makes a conveyance designed to tid
him, and containing provisions capable of aiding him, in dishonestly
withholding from his creditors what belongs to them, is within the
very words, as well as the mischief, of the 13 Eliz. Ch. 5. Such a
deed is made. and contrived of fraud, covin, collusion, or guile, to
the intent or purpose to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.
That these debtors were able to pay all their debts in full, and
fradulently absconded with a great sum of money, is scarcely controverted; that they entertained the design permanently to withdraw
this money from their creditors, and made this assignment, instead
of leaving the property to be disposed of by the law, partly in order
to obtain a release, I am satisfied by the proof. It would be to the
last degree weak and blind not to perceive a fraudulent intent on
their part, pervading their whole conduct. It is correctly argued
that their intent, however bad, cannot vitiate a legal conveyance.
But the question whether the conveyance is legal or not, depends
upon the fact whether it is capable of effectuating or aiding to
execute their unlawful intent to hinder and defeat creditors. If
so, i is void, though the same deed made with an honest purpose
might be good. An unlawful intent is not predicable of an act
which is itself lawful, and cannot by any possibility produce an
unlawful effect. But if a deed may have an unlawful effect, if it
may be an instrument to aid in the execution of an illegal design,
then it is a legitimate inquiry whether in point of fact, such a design
existed, and whether the deed was made in pursuance of it; and
if found to be so, it is unlawful and void. And in this case, the
Hortons entertaining the unlawful design to hinder and defeat their
creditors, by withdrawing from their reach a large sum of money
and appropriating it to their own use, and having made this deed
partly in consequence of that design, and to aid them in its complete execution, and the deed containing a provision capable of
thus aiding them, is forbidden by the law of Rhode Island, and is
void as to creditors.
Suppose one of the assignees with the knowledge of facts they
had, had purchased and paid a full consideration for a piece of
land belonging to the Hortons at the time this assignment was

-626

RECENAfKEBIPAN DXC=SONS.

made; it could nottbe doubted.that such a Deed would be void as
. creditqrsy.for the reason that its design must have been to convert land into.money, so that it could be withdrawn from creditors;
so this Deed is void, because its design is, not to enable them to
carry away the money, b~t what is also unlawful, to keep it to their
own use.
It will be perceived, therefore, that this case stands upon an
actual fraud on the part of the debtor, and a Deed made with intent
to execute that fraud, and capable of Aiding in its execution, and
that the whole extent to which it,is necessary to go, is to hold that
an' absconding debtor cannot so.marshal property which he leaves
within the state, as to enable himself to keep to his own use, what
he fraudulently carries away with him. For such a purpose, he has
no power of control over his property, and if he attempts to exerSciseit, W. act is void as to credItors.
Itis quite unnecessary, therefore, to examine the numerous decisions which have been cited. They are all consistent with the conelusion at which I have. arrived, however widely they.may differ
among themsplveo respectg the rules as to assignments for benefit
of creditors in .dfferent .stat.es, H 8lsey vs. Whitney, (4 Mason,
218,) was a qasQ wlhere a actual fraudulent intent was disclaimed,
and the sole questio4 was, whether the deed was fraudulent on its
face. It has been suggested that this was a decision that a debtor
who conveyed only a part of his property, might stipulate for a
release. I do not so consider it. Certainly the fact was not before
is true Mr.
the Court that the debtor had any other property. ItJustice STORY Says, (page 218,) he does not deem the fact material in

that case. Why not material in that particular case dQes.not appear,
and the facts arpimperfectly stated. It would seem that he was con* sI.ering, not an asqignment for all creditors, but a special assignment
for the benefit of particular creditors who had assented to it, though
what p9sture of .the facts it could haye been so viewed, does
not appear. (19 Pick. 281.) But that the learned Judge did not
intend to decide that a release might be stipulated for, when a part
of a debtor's property had been reserved to his own use, I am led
to think by the evident reluctance with which he arrived at the conSunder
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elusion, that even a release of a debtor's future earnings could be
required, and by the apparent approbation he gives to the decisions
of Leaving vs. Brinkerhoff, 5 John. Ch. 329; Austin vs. Bell,
20 John. 442; and the distinction which he points out on page 230,
between the New York cases and the other decisions. Brooks vs.
Marbury, (11 Whea. 78,) is also clearly distinguishable from this
case. That deed was not alleged to be fraudulent as against creditors, but to be void at common law; and the defect was supposed
to consist in the fact that the grantor entertained a hope that it
might have an influence in suppressing a prosecution for a felony.
But the deed itself contained no provision calculated, or adapted to
realize that hope. If it had held out a preference to those creditors who should forbear to prosecute, it cannot be doubted the Court
would have declared it void. So in this case, the mere fraudulent
intent of the debtors permanently to withdraw a large sum of
money from their creditors, would not vitiate a deed, even if it were
made with a hope that, because of making it, a settlement would be
more likely to be made with creditors. But when the deed is so
contrived as to operate as an instrument to obtain impunity for the
fraud, then it is tainted with the fraud of the grantors; their unlawful intent, instead of resting in their own breasts, has entered
into the deed, and shaped its terms, and modified its effect, and
framed it into an instrument of fraud, whereby to hinder and defeat
the lawful rights of their creditors, and therefore it is void.
There are many decisions that an assignment of part of a
debtor's property, for the benefit of all his creditors, stipulating for
a release, is fraudulent in law and void. Leaving vs. Brinkerioff,
5 John. Ch. 12, 329; Hyslop vs. Clarke, 14 John. 458; Sheldon
vs. -Dodge, 4 Denio, 217; Leutillon vs. Aoffat, 1 Ed. Oh. 451;
Thomas vs. Jenches, 5 Rawle, 221; Hennesey vs. Western Bank,
6 Watts & Serg. 301; In re Wilson, 4 Barr, 430.
Although it is difficult to resist the force of some of the reasoning in these cases, I am not prepared to qay that such a deed is
necessarily fraudulent on its face. If the property not conveyed
by the assignment is left within the reach of creditors, if no actual
fraudulent intent by the debtor existed, and upon the whole case, it
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appears that the instrument was not designed to aid any fraud, and
could not so operate because in point of fact no fraud was either
practised or .intended, perhaps it would be going too far to say that,
under the laws of Rhode Island, such an instrument would be void.
But in my judgment, the only possible question as to the soundness
of these decisions arises from the fact, that they hold the presumption of fraud to be conclusive, and refuse to look beyond the instrument. That such provisions may be made an instrument of
fraud, and when proved to be so, the assignment is void, I entertain
no doubt.
. Still it is not necessary to decide any such- question in this case,
and I have not only intended t6 express my dissent from the position that Halsey vs. 'hitney is to be considered as settling that
law for this circuit.
Because, if the instrument be not void on its face, the creditors who have assented to this deed, have all done so after the
attachments were made, and therefore with notice that the deed
was impeached as invalid against creditors. That under some
circumstances, the assent of creditors to an assignment made
for their benefit may be presumed, I have no doubt, (Ralsey
vs. Fhitney, 4 Mason, 218 ;) thtit when a valid deed is delivered to a
trustee the legal estate vests at -once, is clear, (Brooks vs. Marbury, 11 Whea. 78;) but I am not prepared to hold that the assent of
creditors to a void deed is to be presumed, because the whole foundation for the presumption fails. The law cannot deem such a
deed beneficial to the third party. Upon the assumption that the
deed is valid upon its-face, and is rendered void only by extraneous
facts, the assent of creditors is still not to be presumed, because,
as Chief Justice HosMum sayd, in Camp vs. Camp, (5 Conn. 800,)
"the presimption of assent, is not founded on the face of the instrument, but in the nature and circumstances of the entire case."
Nor will such an assent be presumed to -the prejudice of *thejust
rights of third persons; a legal fiction is not to be permitted so to
operate.- In fictione juris, semper aeguitas existit. (11 Rep. 51;
3 Rep. 56; Waring vs. Denbury, Gilb. Ex. R. 223.) Being void
as against creditors when made, the attachments by the creditors
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were legal, and the subsequent assent of other creditors could not
purge the fraud, nor render the deed valid as against the attachments; and being actually, and not merely constructively fraudulent,
it is wholly void, and cannot be allowed to stand as a security to a
third person who has assented to it, with notice of the fraud, or of
such facts as were sufficient to put him on inquiry, and enable him
to learn the existence of the fraud. (Boyd vs. Dunlop, 1 John.
Ch. R. 482; Harrisvs. Sumner, 2 Pick. 129 ; Halsey vs. Whitney,
4 Mason, 218.
I have also been referred to the charge of Judge HAILE, of the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, on a trial of an action at law in
which this deed came in question. I give my assent to that part of
this charge, in which the jury were instructed, "that it must be
proved that Horton & Brother intended to defraud by this deed,
and that the deed was actually the instrument to defraud, or it does
not hinder, delay or defraud creditors; but if you find this to be
the fact, then the deed is void."
It is upon this ground, as already stated, that I hold this deed
void; and in respect to the question, whether it is void on its face,
I do not find it necessary to express an opinion.
Let a decree be entered, in conformity with the prayer in the
bill, save that no injunction to stop the prosecution of the suit in
the State Court, can be granted by this Court.

In the Supreme Court of .New Jersey.'
IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM FETTER.
1. The clause of the Constitution of the United States, which directs the surrender
of a fugitive from justice upon the demand of the executive authority of the
State from which he fled, contains no grant of power, but is the mere regulation
of an existing right on the part of the State making the surrender.

'We are indebted to A. 0. Zabriskie, Esq., the State Reporter, for this case, who
has furnished us with the sheets of 3 Zab. as far as priuted. -The case will be
found on page 311.
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2. Every sovereign State may, at its option, surrender a criminal to the government
against whose laws he has offended.
8. The United States government have never acknowledged the right of foreign
nations to demand the surrender of fugitives from justice independent of treaty
stipulations.
4; A fugitive from justice from any of the United States may, under the provision
of the Constitution of the United States (Art. 4, 2,) be arrested and detained
in this State, in order to his sirrender, before a requisition is actually made upon
the executive for his surrender.
5. It is not necessary, in order to warrant the surender or detention of the fugitive,
that the crime with which he stands charged should constitute an offence at the
common law.
6. To warrant the surrender or detention of the fugitive, it must appear that the
crime with which he stands charged was committed within the State from which
he is alleged to be a fugitive.

The prisoner was brought before the Chief Justice, at chambers,
on the fifth day of April, 1852, by virtue of a 'writ of habeas
corpus, directed to the keeper of the common jail of the County of
Mercer.
By the return of the writ, it appeared that Win. Fetter was
,detained in custody, as a fugitive from justice from the State of
Cidifornia, by virtue of a commitment, issued on the twentieth day
,of March, 1852, by William C. Howell, Esq., a justice of the peace
of the County of Mercer.
The following facts were developed upon the hearing, being
either duly verified by affidavit or admitted by counsel: The prisoner
:is a citizen of, and resident in the State of Pennsylvania, carrying
-on business in the State of New Jersey. On the 7th of October,
1851, a requisition was- made by the Governor of California, upon
the Governor of Pennsylvania for the surrender of the said William
Fetter, as a fugitive from justice from the State of California,
where he "stands accused of the crime of grand larceny, committed
in the County of San Francisco, in said State." The requisition
is accompiniedb1y an exemplified copy of an indictment found
by the~gaA"ury of the County of San Francisco, at the term
pf August, A. D. 1851, against the said, William Fetter. The
indictment charges, "that William Fetter, on the 30th of October,
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1850, at the City of San Francisco, was the bailee of two hundred
and thirty ounces of gold dust, the proper goods, chattels, and
moneys of C. B., and of the value of $3700; and being such bailee,
he, the said William Fetter, afterwards, to wit, on the same day
and year last aforesaid, at said City, did convert the said gold dust
to his own use, with intent to steal the same, contrary to the force,
form, and effect of the statute in such case made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the people of the State of
California."
In compliance with the requisition thus made, the Governor of
the State of Pennsylvania, on the 18th of March last, issued an
executive warrant for the arrest of the prisoner, and his surrender
to the accredited agent of the State of California. Before the
arrest was effected under the authority of the State of Pennsylvania,
the prisoner came into the State of New Jersey, where he remained
until the time of his arrest under the authority of this State. The
commitment directs that he shall be detained in custody "to await
the requisition of the Governor of California, or otherwise be thence
delivered by due course of law."
Upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus, an application was
made for the discharge of the prisoner, which was argued by Beasley
for the prisoner, and Lanning for the prosecution.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GREEN, CH. J.-The Constitution of the United States (Art. 4,
§ 2,) provides that a person charged in any State with treason,
felony or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in
another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the
State having jurisdiction of the crime. It is insisted that the whole
authority conferred by the Constitution, or fairly deducible from it,
is consequent upon the demand made for the surrender of the
fugitive. That the prisoner has committed no offence against the
sovereignty of this State which can justify his arrest, and that
consequently any arrest by authority of this State, for a crime
committed without its jurisdiction prior to a demand actually made

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

under the provision of the Constitution for the surrender of a
fugitive, is unauthorized, and his detention illegal.
In considering this question, it is material to observe that this
elause of the Constitution does not contain a grant of power. It
confers no right. It is the regulation of a previously existing
right. it makes obligatory upon every member of the confederacy,
the -performance of an act which previously was of doubtful
obligation. All writers upon the law of nations, agree that it is
the right of every sovereign State to expel from its territory, or to
stirender to another fiation in amity with it, an offender against
the laws of such friendly nation. No State is bound to harbor
criminals within its bosom, but may at its option surrender them to
the government against whose laws they have offended. Whether
"anygovernment is bound to make such surrender upon the
demand
of the sovereign of another nation in amity with it, upon the
principle of the comity of nations, is another question upon which
jurists and courts are not agreed. It is held by some writers of
high authority upon the law of nations, that such duty does exist.
Vattel, b. 2, ch. 6, § 76; 2 Burlam. 179, § 23, 27; Story's Conf.
of Laws, § 657.
The obligation was recognized by Chancellor Kent, in the case
of Washburn, a fugitive from Canada to the State of New York,
(4 John. Ch. R., 106,) and also by the Supreme Court of Canada,
in the case of Joseph Fisher, a fugitive from justice in the State
of Vermont. Rex v. Bal, 1 Amer. Jurist, 297; 1 Kent's Com.
37.
Other writers insist that the right, as between independent
sovereign nations, to demafid of each other fugitives from justice,
does not exist independent of- treaty obligations, and such appears
to be the decided weight of -authority in this country. The United
States government have never recognized the right, unless under
treaty stipulations. Commonwedlth v. Deacon, 10 Serg. & R.,
135; Case of Jose Feirara Do Santos, 2 Brock. 493; United
026;
6s,
S&tes v. Davis, 2 Suinher, 486; Story on Conf. of L
a 9tory's Com. on Con., § 1,892; Jefferson's Letter to Washington,
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7th November, 1791; Jefferson's Letter to Genet, 1793; 1 Amer.
State Papers, 175; Story's Letter to Gov. Everett, 6th June,
1835, cited in 2 Life of Story, 197; 1 Kent's Com. 37, note c.
But, whatever difference of opinion may exist in regard to the
obligation resting upon one nation to surrender a fugitive from
justice, upon the demand of another nation in amity with it, there
is no denial and no question of the right of every sovereign nation
to surrender fugitives within its territory. The whole effect of the
Constitution was to confer upon each member of the confederacy a
right to demand from every other member of the confederacy, a
fugitive, and to make obligatory the surrender which was before
discretionary. If, then, there exists, independent of constitutional
provision or treaty obligation, a right in every sovereign State to
surrender criminals against the laws of other countries, there must
also, of necessity, exist in every state the power of arresting and
detaining such fugitive. The mere power of surrender, without
the power of arrest and detention, would be nugatory. It is remarkable, indeed, that both the Constitution and the Act of Congress of 1793, assume that the one power is a necessary consequence of the other. Neither the Constitution nor the law confers,
except by implication, the power of arrest or imprisonment.
We find this right of arrest and imprisonment by the civil magistrates of offenders against the laws of another government recognized from a very early period. Thus, in Bex vs. Hfutchinson, 29
Car., 11; 3 Keble, 785, the Court of K. B., upon habeas corpus,
refused to bail a prisoner who was committed on suspicion of
murder, committed in Portugal. And in the case of Col. Lundy,
2 Vent. 314, it was agreed on a consultation of all the judges,
that there was nothing in the habeas corpus act to prevent a person
guilty of a capital offence in Ireland (then a distinct kingdom,)
being sent there to be tried.
'In the case of _ex v. Kimberly, 2 Stra. 848, the prisoner was
committed by a justice of the peace in England, for a felony committed contrary to an Irish Act of Parliament, in order to be
transmitted to Ireland to be tried, the offence having been committed there.
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On being brought before the King's Bench by habeas. corpus,
Strange, for the prisoner moved for his discharge, or for bail, on the
ground that justices of the peace in England, had no power over
crimes committed in Ireland, which was a distinct kingdom; and
that it was against the habeas corpus act to remove the prisoner to

Ireland. But the Court, upon the authority of the cases above
cited, remanded the prisoner, observing that it he was not removed
to Ireland in a reasonable time, application might be again made
to the Court for his discharge. See also, .Mure v. Kaye, 4 Taunt.
84; 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 14, 46.
In the case of Daniel Washurn, the prisoner was detained in
custody by virtue of a mittimus from the recorder of the City of
Troy, under charge of a crime committed in Canada. Upon the
prisoner being brought up by a writ of habea8 corpus, Chancellor
Kent said, "it is the law and 'Usage of nations, resting on the
plainest principles of justice and public policy, to deliver up
offenders charged with felony and other high crimes, and fleeing
from the country in which the crime was committed into a foreign
and friendly jurisdiction. When a case of that kind occurs, it
becomes the duty of the civil magistrate, on due proof of the fact,
to commit the fugitive, to the end that a reasonable time may be
afforded for the government here to deliver him up, or for the
foreign government to make the requisite application to the proper
authorities for his surrender." 4 John. Ch. R. 106.
If this principle be sound, as applied to the intercourse of independent foreign nations, in support of the right to reclaim fugitives
from justice, it applies with far greater force and clearness in support of the express prouision of the Constitution, making the
surrender of fugitives from justice, obligatory upon every member
of the confederacy. The denial of the power to arrest and detain
an offender until the demand for his *surrender be actually made,
-would, it is manifest, render the provision of the Constitution well-nigh nugatory. If a person committing murder, robbery, or other
high crime in one State, may, by crossing a river or an imaginary line,
avoid arrest or detention until an executive requisition and order
for his surrender may be obtained, the execution of the criminal
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law would be impotent indeed. Sound public policy, good faith, a
fulfilment of the requirements of the Constitution, all require that
the arrest and detention be made of the offender, wherever he may
be found, preparatory to a demand and. surrender.
The exercise of the power has repeatedly been sanctioned by the
American Courts.
In The People v. Schenck, 2 John. R. 479, the prisoner having
been indicted for stealing a gun, the jury found specially, that he
stole the gun in New Jersey, and brought it into the State of New
York. The Court held that the act, as found, constituted no
crime against the laws of New York; but they ordered the prisoner
to be detained in prison for three weeks, and that notice be given
to the executive of the State of New Jersey, that the prisoner was
detained on a charge of felony committed in this State.
In the matter of Thomas . Goodhue, in the Mayor's Court of
the City of New York, 1 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 427, upon the return of the habeas corpus, it appeared that the prisoner was
detained on three different commitments. The first commitment
was under the statute for apprehending and punishing disorderly
persons, under which he was committed to Bridewell for sixty days.
The second and third commitments stated that the prisoner is
charged, on the oaths of R. W. and others, with having at Lexington, in the State of Kentucky, fraudulently and by false pretences,
and exhibiting forged letters of credit, obtained divers sums of
money of several individuals and mercantile houses with intent to
defraud.
Riker, recorder, said, "1It appears upon the oath of a witness,
which oath is taken on competent authority, that the prisoner has
committed a public offence against the laws of the State of Kentucky, and that he is a fugitive from the justice of that State.
The Constitution of the United States provides expressly for his
arrest. The Constitution is sacred, and we are bound by it. It is
the supreme law of the land. It may be said, that though it be
true that on the demand of the executive power of Kentucky, the
prisoner may doubtless be given up, yet until he is demanded, he
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is to be held at large. This cannot be the meaning of the Constitution. We may hold a fugitive, to give a reasonable time to
demand him. The decision of the Court, therefore, is that Thomas
F. Goodhue be remanded and detained in custody six weeks, to give
time to the executive of Kentucky to demand him, under and in
pursuance of the Constitution of the United States."
The prisoner was subsequently brought before Chancellor Kent,
by habeas corpus, on the 14th of October following, and the Chancellor, considering that a sufficient time had elapsed since the commitment, in August preceding, for the executive of the State of
Kentucky to have demanded the prisoner, according to the Constitution, and no such demand appearing to have been made, ordered
his discharge. In the matter of Goodhue, 1 Rogers' City Hall
Recorder; 2 John. Ch. R. 198.
In The Commonwealth v. Deacon, 10 Serg. & Rawle, 135, Tilghman, Chief Justice,. though he denied the right in that case to hold
the prisoner, on the ground that the government would not surrender him, held the following language: "I grant that when the
executive has been in the habit of delivering up fugitives, or are
obliged by treaty, the magistrates may issue warrants to arrest of
their own accord, (on proper evidence,) in order the more effectually
to accomplisli the, intent of the government, by preventing the
escape of the criminal. On this principle, we arrest offenders who
have fled from one of the United States to another, even before
demand has been made by the Executive of the State from which
they fled." Here is a statement of the existence of the practice
not only, but a vindiction of the principle upon which it rests, viz:
to accomplish the intent of the government, and to carry into
effect the provision of the Constitution. S. C. 2 Wheeler's Crim.
Cases, 17.
I pm of opinion, both upon principle and authority, that a fugitive from justice, from either of the United States, may, under the
provision of the Constitution, be arrested and detained in this State
preparatory to his surrender, before a requisition is actually made
by the Executive of the State where the crime is committed. It is
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an exercise of power essential to the full operation of the Constitution, and has been sanctioned by a long and uniform course of
practice.
I am aware that the power was denied in the case of The People
v. Wright, 2 Caines, 212. But that case does not appear to have
undergone mature deliberation, and must be considered as overruled by the late authorities.
Nor is the principle impugned by the fact that the legislatures of
several of the states have made express provision by law, for the
arrest and detention of fugitives from justice, prior to an executive
requisition for their extradition. It amounts to no more than a
regulation of the exercise of an existing right.
II. It is further objected, that the offence with which the prisoner
stands charged is not a crime Within the meaning of the Constitution. Admitting the position taken by counsel in argument, that
the offence specified does not constitute larceny at the common law,
it is nevertheless certified by the Governor California, to be grand
larceny under the laws of that State. It is, moreover, an offence
of a highly immoral character, and as appears by the bill of indictment, which must be regarded as prima facia evidence of the fact,
is a crime by the law of the State of California.
II. The original affidavit upon which the warrant issued was
clearly defective, as it does not allege that any crime had been committed by the prisoner within the State of California, from which he
is alleged to be a fugitive. In the matter of .Hazyward, 1 Sand.
Sup. Co. R. 701.
But inasmuch as it appears by the subsequent affidavit and the
evidence adduced upon the hearing, that the alleged crime was committed in California; that the defendant stands charged with the
crime there, and is a fugitive from justice in that State, he is not
entitled to be discharged, but must be continued in custody.
Should a demand for his surrender not be made by the executive of
California within a reasonable time, the prisoner will be entitled to
his discharge.
Ordered accordingly.
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New York Supreme Court 7th Judicial.Di8trict.-Ceneral Term.
HORACE CHITTENDEN vS. ELECTA CHITTENDEN AND OTHERS..
1. A society which has claimed and exercised the rights and powers of a corporation for twenty years, is a corporation de facto, and as such, capable of taking a
bequest, though the proof of its incorporation be technically defective.
2. A devise to an unincorporated association is void at law, and an incorporation
after the testator's death will not validate it.
8. Devise to the ,Methodist and Presbyterian Foreign Missionary Societies." At
the testator's death, there was no corporation of the former name; but the "Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church," was subsequently incorporated, whose object, as stated by its Charter, was "to diffuse more generally the
blessings of education, civilization and christianity throughout the United States
and elsewhere." Held,that this society could not take; and per SELDE, J.that it
was not a "Foreign Missionary Society," under the terms of the devise.
4. The "Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the
United States," were incorporated in 1799, and authorized to take by devise, prior
to the testator's death, the corporation duly constituted an agency,or board, styled
the "Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, &c."which was the
only Foreign Missionary Society in body of that church in existence, at the time.
Hfeld, that this Boardwas incompetent to take in itself, and that a devise to it was
not a devise to the "Trustees of the General Assembly."
5. The peculiar jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, in England, with regard to
charitable uses, where the devise, &c. is made to no certain or competent person,
or for an object so vague as not to admit, on a liberal interpretation, of being definitely ascertained, is derived from the statute of 48 Elizabeth, and has never been
adopted in New York.
6. It seem. that a trust for charitable purposes, if express, is within the Revised
Statutes of New York.
SELDEN, J.-This

suit involves the validity of several devises in

the will of Daniel M. Chittenden, who died in the County of Monroe, on or about the 28th day of February, 1839.
The clauses in the will upon which the questions arise, are as follows: " I further will and direct, that upon the marriage or death
of my said wife, the said $7,000, if it shall rest in bonds and mortgages on either of the farms aforesaid, be called in and paid equally
to the Methodist and Presbyterian Foreign Missionary Societies,
by what name or style soever they are now or hereafter may be
called or known."
"Seventh, I will and bequeath unto the Trustees of the Presby-
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terian Church of Churchville, the sum of one thousand dollars, of a
certain bond and mortgage, executed by Aldrich Wiley, and bearing date the 31st day of March, 1837, for the payment of one
thousand and fifty-five dollars, if said bond and mortgage shall remain unpaid at the time of my decease; if not, I then will and direct
that my said executors pay, out of means that they may have unappropriated, the said sum of one thousand dollars to said Trustees
for the benefit of said church, as it may be for its interest and the
cause of religion."
Lastly, I give and bequeath the residue of my property, of whatever kind or wheresoever situated, unto the said Methodist and
Presbyterian Foreign Missionary Societies, to be divided between
them."
The bequest to the Trustees of the Presbyterian Church, at
Churchville, is claimed by the Trustees of the Presbyterian Society
of Churchville, a body claiming to have been incorporated in 1832,
under the general statute providing for the incorporation of religious
societies.
This claim is resisted mainly on the ground that the proof of incorporation is insufficient. But, admitting the proof to be technically defective, the society has claimed and exercised the rights and
powers of a corporation for a period of nearly twenty years, and is
therefore to all intents and purposes a corporation defacto ; which
is, I think, sufficient for the purposes of this suit; I see therefore
no reason to doubt the validity of this legacy.
Upon the devises to the Methodist and Presbyterian Foreign
Missionary Societies, two questions arise:-1. Are they or either
of them good at law? 2. If not, can they be sustained by a Court
of Equity in this State, as charities?
In regard to the bequest to the Methodist Society, it is perfectly
clear that it can be upheld only as a charity.
Nothing is better settled, than that a devise to an unincorporated association is void at law. The fact that the Missionary
Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church was incorporated shortly
after the death of the testator, cannot aid this devise. fBaptist Association v. Hart's _xecutors, 4 Wheat. 1 ; Idem v. Smith
Robinson, 3 Peters in Appendix, 481.
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It is true that if the bequest had been made to take effect infuturo, when the society should be incorporated, it would have been
good as a executory devise, Inglis v. The Trustees of the Sailor8'

Snug I~arbor, 3 Peters, 99. But this is a present devise, to take
effect immediately. The principle of these cases, so far as this
point is concerned, has never been questioned.
There is. another difficulty about this devise-neither the Methodist Associationi, before its incorporation, nor the corporation afterwards, was a foreign Missionary Society. Its object, as stated in
its charter, is to diffuse more generally the blessings of education,
civilization and Christianity throughout the United States and elsewhere. But for the word "elsewhere," it would be a perversion of
its objects, and a misapplication of its funds to act at all as a
ForeignMissionary Society. The defined, and therefore it is to be
inferred, chief object of its incorporation, was to promote the cause
of education at home. If, therefore, any doubt existed as to the
legal validity of the devise upon the previous point, I think it
could hardly be claimed at law by this corporation, in consequence
of the nisdescription of its name and character. This, however, I
deem of little condequence, because the want of an incorporation is
fatal to the devise, except as a charity, and if the law of charitable uses, as it has been administered in England, is in force in this
State, then a Court of Equity would be bound to overlook much
greater defects than this, in order to give effect to the intent of the
testator.
With respect to the devise of the Presbyterian Foreign Missionary
Society, a different quiestion arises. This devise is claimed by a corporation in existence both at the time of the making of the will, and
of the death of the testator.
The "1Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian
Church in the United States," is a corporation, as the case shows,
by virtue of an act of the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania, passed in March, 1799, and is authorized by the express
terms of its charter, to take by devise. The act transfers to the
corporation, all the property and funds of the General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church, a body which by'the constitution of that
churchi was required to meet, and which has always met annually.'
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The General Assembly is authorized by the charter, to change
one-third of the trustees at each annual meeting, and to give written instructions to the corporation concerning the disposition and
management of the funds, which the latter is bound to obey.
At the annual meeting of the Assembly in 1837, it established
an agency or Board, which it styles "The Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,"
to which, in the language of one of its resolutions, it "entrusted
the superintendence of the Foreign Missionary operations of the
Presbyterian Church."
It appears, I think, with sufficient clearness, that this Board was
the only Presbyterian Foreign Missionary Society or body in the
United States, in active existence at the time of the devise or of
the death of the testator.
Upon this proof, it is insisted by the defendants, Miller & Lowrie,
that the devise is made to and vests in the corporation last named,
on the ground that the Board of Foreign Missions being a mere
agency or branch of the corporation, a gift or devise to the former
is virtually a gift or devise to the corporation.
The only cases cited in support of the ground taken, which bear
at all upon it, are those of Christ Church, 1 W. Black, 90, and
Hornbeeh vs. American Bible Society, 2 Sand. Ch. R., 133.
These cases do not sustain the position. In the former, it was
expressly held that a devise to the use of certain officers of the
corporation, was not a devise to the use of the corporation itself,
but that it might be upheld, and it was upheld by virtue of the
Statute of Elizabeth. In the latter case, the devise 'as to the
Theological Seminary at New Brunswick, under the charge of the
Protestant Reformed Dutch Church. The corporation was called
"The Synod of the Dutch Church. The corporation was therefore substantially named in the devise. It was doing no great
violence to the language used, to hold, as the Yice-Chancellor did,
that the devise 'vas to the corporation for the use of the Seminary.
But, in addition to this, that case was put expressly and mainly
upon the ground that the bequest was good as a charitable use.
Indeed, I do not see how it is possible to hold that this at law is
i good devise to the Trustees of the General A3sembly. If so, do
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they take it absolutely, or clothed with a trust; and if accompanied
by a trust, how is the execution of that trust, according to the will
of the devisor, to be secured? He intended the Board of Foreign
Missions to be the dispensers of his bounty; but that Board is the
creature of the General Assembly, and may be dissolved at its will.
If sustained as a charity there are none of these difficulties.
The Court has then only to see that the general intent of the
testator is carried into effect as he designed, if practicable;if not,
then in some other way which to the Court may seem proper.
In this devise the corporation is not named or referred to, and I
think it clear, that, if sustained at all, it must be as a charitable
use.
That the devises to the Missionary Societies could be supported
as made to the individual persons composing the respective associations, has not been, and could not be with any show of reason,
insisted upon.
We have, then, in respect to both these devises, to meet the
question, how far the doctrines of the English Court of Chancery,
concerning charities, are in force at the present time in this State.
Preliminary to this, however, is another question, which, as it
was not discussed upon the argument, I do not intend to dwell upon
here.
How do these devises become charities, if at all? No use is limited or defined by the terms of the devises themselves, unless such
limitation is to be inferred from the name of the devisees.
Is, then, a devise to be regarded as a charity merely because the
devisee is called by a name which is indicative.of charitable objects ?
This cannot be, because an association of gamblers might assume'
such a name. It may be, however, that it will be presumed in all
cases, when nothing is said on the subject, that a devise to a society
is intended to be used to promote the general and known objects of
the' association; and that when those objects are made to appear,
the use will be held to be limited by them.
If so, a trust is created. Is that trust within the prohibition of
our statute' concerning uses and. trusts ? I am aware that the
Assistant Vice-Chancellor, in the case of Shotwell vs. Mott, 2 Sand.
Chan. Rep. 46, held that trusts for- charitable purposes were not
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within the statute, that it was aimed only at private uses and trusts,
and was not intended to affect those of a public or charitable nature.
But I am not entirely satisfied with the reasoning in that case. In
a later case, in the Superior Court of New York, Judge Duer, in
speaking of "charitable uses," uses this strong language: "As such
uses are most plainly and directly repugnant to the statutory provisions in relation to trusts and perpetuities, we confess our present
inability to understand or conceive why they are not now to be considered as positively forbidden, and therefore abolished. That they
are embraced within the terms of those statutory provisions, terms
as explicit as strong, and as comprehensive as the language can
furnish, it is impossible to deny, and we yet remain to be convinced
that they are not just as certainly embraced within their spirit and
policy." Ayer8 vs. The Trustees of Meth. Epis. Church et al., 8'
N. York Legal Observer, 80.
This, therefore, is an unsettled question, and one which I do not
intend to discuss at length here. Were it necessary to pass upon
it, I should feel constrained to hold, in accordance with the views of
Judge Duer, that the language of the statute is too explicit and
clear to admit of the exception contended for.
But although I do not see how the devises in this case can be
considered as charities, unless they are also considered as trusts, yet
as the statute prohibits only "express trusts," and as the trusts in
this case, if they exist at all, may be regarded as implied, and as
this may by possibility create a valid distinction, I feel disposed to
pass this question, and come directly to the main point in the case.
Can these two devises, then, be sustained as Charities ? In other
words-does the law of charitable uses, as formerly administered in
the English Court of Chancery, obtain in this State at the present
time?
This question, by common consent, depends upon another. Did
the Court of Chancery in England derive the peculiar jurisdiction
it exercises in regard to charitable uses from the statute of 43 Eliz.,
or did it possess the power prior to and independent of that statute?
Because I think it perfectly clear, and therefore shall not attempt
to prove, that the statute of Eliz., so far as it relates to charitable
uses, was not adopted into our common law previous to the repeal
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of the English statutes in 1788, and therefore is not, and never
was the law of this State; and consequently that no decisions based
upon that act are of any force here.
The question presented is one of very great interest, and one
which has received the investigation and elaborate examination of
the ablest jurists in this country, as well as in England. It is not
probable, therefore, that it can be further elucidated by anything
which I can say. But as it becomes my duty to pass upon the
question, and as the opinions and decisions upon it are conflicting,
I may be permitted, without the imputation of arrogance, briefly
to express my views. In doing so I shall rely solely upon the
researches of others, and upon the facts and authorities which those
researches have developed. It does not appear to me to be difficult,. with the light obtained from repeated examinations, to ascertain the state of the law on this subject at the time the statute of
43 Eliz. was passed.
-By the common law, a devise or legacy, to be valid, must be
definite and certain. A vague bequest was void. Every use, also,
must be certain, and must have an estate to support it. Bequests
made to no one in particular, although for objects clearly defined,
or made to certain and competent persons, but for an indefinite
object, were alike void.
It will be seen, therefore, that bequests to uses were subject to
two distinct classes of defects; one relating to the person to whom
made, the other to the object of the use.
These principles were recognized in chancery as well as at common law; yet the Court of Chancery, from a very early period,
manifested a disposition, in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction
over trusts, to relax in some degree the common law rules in regard
to certain classes of trusts which it deemed especially meritorious.
Where, therefore, a bequest was made in trust for some piou8 or
charitableuse, although the object might not be defined with that

precision and certainty which the strict rules of the common law
required, yet if it was capable of being ascertained with reasonable
certainty, the Court would sometimes uphold and establish the
trust.
The difference between the common law Courts and the Court of
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Chancery consisted merely in the different degrees of certainty
required in defining the use to which the bequest was to be applied.
Both alike required in all cases that there should be a certain and
competent person to take the bequest.
All the elaborate research which has been given to this subject
has failed to prove that the Court of Chancery, prior to the statute
of Elizabeth, ever assumed to establish a bequest, however meritorious or clear its object, if made to no one in particular, or to a
person or body incompetent in law to take. If any of the fifty
cases cited from the Report of the Record Commissioners of England arc of~such a character, the description of'those cases given in
a note to Vidal et al. vs. Girard'sExecutors, 2 How. S. C. R. 155,
fails to show it.
It is true that where the difficulty consisted not in the creation
of the trust, but in its execution, as where a bequest in trust was
made to a person or body legally competent to take, but incapable
of executing the trust; or where for some other reason, there was
a want of a suitable trustee to execute a trust originally valid, the
Court of Chancery would appoint new trustees. Several of the
fifty cases referred to, were of this description. But this was no
more than the exercise of the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court
o-er trusts. It was not necessary that the use should be alaritable,.
to enable it to exercise this power.
THence it appears that in regard to one of the two classes of
defects by which bequests to uses were liable to be defeated, to wit:
the want of a competent person to take a bequest, the rules ef the
Court of Chancery and of the Common Law Courts, prior to the
enactment of the Statute of 43 Eliz., chap. 4, were the same; and
that in regard to the other, they differed only in this-that the
Court of Chancery, from its anxiety to support uses for favorite
objects, would sometimes be satisfied with a less degree of certainty
in defining those objects, than the Courts of Common Law.
It will readily be seen by those who have looked at all into the'
subject, how far this action of the Court of Chancery falls short of
that peculiar jurisdiction which it subsequently assumed in regard
to "charitable uses."
35
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Prior to the Statute of Eliz., therefore, the Court of Chancery,
by virtue of its ordinary ju isdiction and powers, could give no
relief when a bequest was made to no one in particular, or to one
incompetent to take, zowever meritorious and clearly defined its
object, nor when the object was so vague as not to admit, on a
liberal interpretation, of being definitely ascertained, although
made to- a competent person; but the king had a prerogative as
paiens patriae, or general guardian of the public interest, by virtue
of which he assumed, in certain cases, to dispense with the rules
of law.
In cases, therefore, where the bequest was deemed of peculiar
merit, but the defect was such as courts could not overlook, resort
was had to this power of the king. Originally, the power was
exercised by the king in person, under his sign manual; but afterward it became the practice, instead of his taking the burden upon
himself, to file an information in the name of the Attorney General,
and upon this proceeding the Chancellor exercises a jurisdiction
nearly if not quite co-extensive with the prerogative of the crown.
It was in suits thus instituted alone, in regard to which the Chancellor represented the monarch and was clothed with the prerogatives of royalty, that power was assumed to supersede the rules of
law.

The jurisdiction belonged not to the Court, but to the Chancellor
inperson.
But it will be seen that this acting in a double capacity in
refereice to the same question bound by the rules of law in one
form of proceeding, 'and with a discretion to set them aside in
another, must have been *extremely embarrassing to the Chancellor,
especially at a period when the distinction between their powers as
a Court, and as the personal representative of majesty, was not
very clearly defined.
It is probable, therefore, that the Chancellors frequently hesitated, even upon information by the Attorney General, to go as far
as the peculiar religious sentiments of the day required.
From this brief sketch, we are enabled to see the precise state of
the law at the time the Statute of Elizabeth was passed, as well as
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the motive for its enactment. It cannot reasonably be supposed
that that statute was enacted for the mere purpose of creating a
new jurisdiction. The argument of Chief Justice Marshall in
Baptist Association vs. Hart's Executors, 4 Wheat. 1; and that of
Mir. Justice Story in The Same vs. Smith & Robinson, 3 Peters,
482, in my view conclusively prove the contrary.
They show that it was not until nearly a century after the Statute
of Elizabeth was passed, during the reign of Charles II., that the
Court of Chancery assumed to take cognizance upon original bill
of that class of uses which it was supposed could only be established
by virtue of that act. See Attorney General vs. Newman, 1 Ch.
Cas. 157; West vs. Knight, ibid, 134.
But they show further, that in many of the earliest cases which
occurred under the statute, and of course at a period when the
scope and object of the act would be most likely to be rightly'
understood, the Court in enforcing such uses, repeatedly declared
in express terms, that it established the use by virtue of the Statute
of Elizabeth, and that independent of that act, it would be void;
and in addition to this, that since the Statute of Eliz., the courts
have uniformly refused to enforce any use as a charity, except
such as came within the act; in short, that a "charitable use" in
legal parlance, means a use for some object within the Purview of
that act, and nothing else.
It is impossible, as it seems to me, to reconcile these undisputed
facts with the idea that the Court of Chancery prior to the statute
in question, had adopted the doctrine of the Civil Law in regard to
charities, and exercised the same jurisdiction in regard to them as
afterwards.
The contradictory dicta among some of the earlier judges, arose
from their not always discriminating between the proper jurisdiction
of the Court, and the personal jurisdiction of the Chancellor, as the
depository of the royal prerogative.
The opinion of Lord Readesdale, in the comparatively modern
case of The Attorney General vs. The Mayor of Dublin, 1 Bligh's
New Rep., 812 and 347, places the matter in its true light. For
although he says "That statute (43 Eliz.,) only created a new
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jurisdiction, it created no new law," he proceeds to state the reason,
to wit: that prior to the statute, the same relief might have been
obtained by filing an information in the Court of Chancery in the
name of the Attorney General, and adds, "the right which the
Attorney General has to file an information, is a right of prerogative." He does not intimate that he could before the statute, have
exercised the jurisdiction upon origlnal bill.
This case is a strong authority to show that it was only the
King himself, or the Chancellor, while wielding his prerogative,
who could grant the relief; and I apprehend that all the judges
who had previously asserted the jurisdiction of the Court prior to
the Statute of Eliz., referred to this personal jurisdiction of the
Chancellor. The whole question, then, is narrowed down to this:
Did the Chancellor of this State, and do our Courts of Equity now
possess that peculiar power which was exercised by the Chancellors
of England as the representatives of majesty, and of the personal
prerogatives of the monarch? Can this question admit of serious
doubt?
The royal authority belonged to a different age, a different state
of society, and different institutions from ours. It is repugnant to
all our notions, to all American notions, and will never, I think, be
judicially recognized in this country.
What sound reason can be given for stretching the power of tfhe
Court, and abandoning all fixed rules in favor of a particular class
of cases ? If we look to the experience of England, do we find
any encouragement f9r such a course? On the contrary, we see
that she has -been driven by this very policy on the part of her
courts to the enactment of restraining acts to prevent the mischiefs
arising from it. The same causes will produce the same consequences elsewhere.
Our statute concerning uses and trusts, is a somewhat stringent
law, and may have been intended as a substitute for some of the
mortmain acts of England.
-But I am of opinion that except in the creation of perpetuities,
we may at this day safely leave men to the guidance of their own
judgment, in respect to the disposition of their estates, provided we
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apply to their acts, principles which are fixed and uniform. But
the adoption of special rules for particular cases, or particular
classes of cases, can hardly fail to disturb the equilibrium which the
operation of general laws has a tendency to produce.
The natural sentiments of men, if left to their own untrammeled
action, will lead to an appropriate distribution of their bounty.
But the interposition of a special legislation, or a strained judicial
construction in favor of a certain class of gifts, will inevitably produce irregularity, and in the end prove pernicious.
In coming to the conclusion that the law of charitable uses as
understood and administered in England, is not in force in this
State, I am aware that I come in conflict not only with the opinion
of eminent jurists in other States, but with several decisions in our
own State, made by courts entitled to the highest respect, and particularly with the cases of Knlskeen v. Lutheran Churches, 1 Sand.
Ch. R. 439; Shotwell v. Mott, 2 id. 46; and Hornbeck's -Executors v. American Bible Society, ibid, 183.
But this great question cannot, I think, be considered as definitely settled in this State. It was not so regarded by the Superior
Court in the City of New York; in Ayres v. The Methodist .Episcopal Church, 8 New York Legal Observer, 17, and will scarcely
be considered as entirely at rest until it has been passed upon by
our highest judicial tribunal.
There must be a judgment in conformity with the conclusions to
which I have arrived, dismissing the bill as to the defendants who
represent the 1st Presbyterian Society in Churchville, with costs,
anq sustaining it as to the other devises with proper provisions to
carry out the objects of the bill in that respect, and providing for
the payment of the executor's costs out of the estate.
Mr. S. Stevens, for Plaintiff.
Messrs. S. Matthews and 0. Hastings, for Defendants.

5R0W

550"

A1AICW DCIIONS.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
WILLIAM W. WOODFOLK VO. THE NASHVILLE AND CHATTANOOGA
RAIL ROAD COMPANY.

I. Where land is taken for a public use, or by a Rall Road Company, in the absence
of any special provision, only the quantity of the land appropriated, tihe place
where it lies, with reference to external circumstances, aud the form in which it

is taken, can enter into the estimate of the damages.
2. But any general effect that the actual or contemplated construction of the road,
or special effect of ita location at the particular place, may have upon the value
,of the land, whether to improve or lessen the price, is not to be considered in

the valuation.
8. So the incidental injuries or advantages, benefits or injuries caused thereby, are

to be left out of view.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CAROTHERS, J.-The defendants located their road for about 500
feet on a six acre lot of plaintiff, in the vicinity of Nashville. The
road runs through one corner of the lot, separating about threequarters of an acre from the main lot, and occupying in the bed,
which is from seven to ten feet deep, about one-quarter of an acre.
The plaintiff has his family residence on the lot, and it is handsomely and beautifully improved. The part separated has upon it
some negro houses, 'a cow house, well and spring-house. The
plaintiff applied to the Circuit Court of Davidson County, under the
Act of 1845, ch. 1, chartering said Company, for the appointment
of commissioners to agsesa the damages sustained by him in consequence of the location of said road upon his land. This was at
May Term, 1850, when five commissioners were appointed. At
October Term,-1850, the report made by said commissioners was
quashed for informalities in their .proceedings, and five other men
appointed.. A majority of these commissioners "assess the loss and
damage at $2,000, and that the benefit and advantage the said
Woodfolk has received from said road, consisting in the increased
value of his said premises, amounts to the sum of $2,500, at least,"
so they allow him nothing. From this report, he appealed to the
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Court, and the cause was tried by a special jury before the Court
at January Term, 1852. A verdict was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff against the defendants for $750. The defendants moved
for a new trial, which was overruled, and now appeal in error to
this Court.
The bill of exceptions contains the evidence, on
which the verdict was founded.- It consists of the survey and description of the lot, the track of the road through it, and the-opinions
of witnesses as to the injury done to the plaintiff, on the one hand,
and the enhancement of the value of his property on the other.
The injuries enumerated are of this character: cutting off the
plaintiff from his well, spring-house, &c., the necessity of moving
out-buildings, erecting a stone wall in the cut made for the road,
to keep up the ground and prevent accidents, detracting from the
beauty and comfort of the lot, as a family residence, &c. Against
all this, on the other hand, it is proved that his lot is enhanced in
value in the market by the erection of the road, from 25 to 50 per
cent. On all these points, the proof is, as it must be, when consisting of the opinions of men on any subject, very conflicting and
unsatisfactory on all the items of account on both sides. It must
necessarily partake more of the nature of guessing than of certainty.
The law was laid down by the circuit judge in his charge, in part
and so far as it is necessary in our examination, as follows :-You
will recur to the testimony and ascertain, from that, the value of the
land taken for the road, and take into consideration such other
inconveniences and damages as shall have resulted to the plaintiff
from the acts of defendants. You will estimate what danages the
plaintiff may have suffered, if you shall think that any have accrued,
then you will look to the testimony in the cause, and ascertain
whether the acts of the defendants in locating the road upon the
land of the plaintiff, have resulted in benefit or advantage to him;
on ascertaining this, you will determine whether the land of the
plaintiff appreciated in value. You will not look to the fact that
the road is a public benefit or advantage, unless that public benefit
or advantage be inseparable from the benefit conferred upon the
plaintiff. If any advantages have resulted, you will determine
what they are and assess their value. You will then take the
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amount of benefit or'advantage from the amount of damages, and
the remainder, if any, will make your verdict. In ascertaining the
benefits and danfages, you will confine .yourselves to the time when
the -defendaiits appropriated the land of the plaintiff to the use and
construction of the road." Thus is the law laid down by the Circuit
Court, and both parties are dissatisfied with it. The defendants
bring up the case by appeal, and the plaintiff by writ of error. It
now devolves upon this Court to settle the law and indicate the
proper rules.for this and all other cases of the kind, and there will
doubtless' be many in future, as 'the spirit of public improvement
has now taken possession. of the minds of -the people, and guides
.the -public councils of our State. They should be such as will
guard the rights of the citizens on the one hand, and not improperly
impede the cause of public improvement on the other. A wide
range has been taken in the argument, evincing learning, research
and ability on the part of the counsel, worthy of the importance of
the subject; as well as profitable to the Court. We feel much indebted 'to 'this full and able examination and presentation of the
questions - involved t both, upon principle and authority, for the
opinion we have been, able to form on this most vexed and perplexing. subject. We -have had'the advantage of all the lights that
could be brought to the elucidation of the questions involved, by the
best legal talents and most profound research. It would, at this
day, be worse than useless, to enter into a discussion of the existence
andexten;t of the right of eminent domain, and to prove that it is
inherent in this and all other governments. That is now well
settled and admitted 'on: all hands -to exist in every State and
country. No one now questions the right of the State to take
private property-for public use, against the consent of the owner.
Questions frequently arise and may come up again as to the extent
and right exerciso of this conceded power.. But it is not controverted that it applies to the case of public roads, and that rail roads,
whether constructed- by the State or chartered companies, are of
that character. -The land of the plaintiff has been taken for this
purpose, and was therefore legally and rightfully taken. But he
has a corresponding right which is as clear, well guarded and indis-
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putable as the other-a claim for the value of his property. The
State may take his property for the public use, but the State must
see that the public pays him for it. The people, in whom the
sovereign power properly resides in this free country, were not
willing to leave this dangerous, though essential right of eminent
domain, a power to deprive a man of his property against his consent, unguarded by barriers of a permanent nature, inserted in their
constitutional restrictions upon it. They impliedly delegate the
right, but protect the citizen and secure to him the value of his
private property. The provision for this purpose in the Federal
Constitution is, "_Nor shall private propertJbe taken for public use
without just compensation." Amendments, Article 5. But this as
well as other provisions of the same character, are intended solely
as limitations on the exercise of power by the general government
and is not applicable to the legislation of the States. The State
constitutions are framed by different persons, and have distinct
objects in view. The State governments are not restricted by the
limitation of a power expressed in general terms in the constitution
of the United States. The States must be included in terms,. or
necessary implication, in such limitations or regulation of powers,
or they are not affected, Barrow vs. The Mayor of Baltimore, 7
Peters, 243; 2 J. J. Mar. 45. The constitution of the United States
cannot therefore be looked to for the rule to govern us in this case.
But the people of this State, and perhaps most if not all the
others, being equally jealous of the abuse of power, saw proper to
restrict and limit the po'Wer of the State government on the same
subject. Our people in their State Convention made this provision:
"No man's particular services shall be demanded, or property taken
or applied to public use, without the consent of his representative,
or without just.compensation being made therefor." Article 1,
sec. 21. The power to take private property for "public use," is
here impliedly admitted, and the Legislature undoubtedly possess it
with the limitation prescribed, that is, by making just compensation. This is only in affirmance of the great principles of the
common law. The important and only question in this case is,"
what is meant by. "just compensation ?" how is it to be ascertained,
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and how, when and in what paid? When this is settled. upon a
fair construction of that instrument, it must prevail, and no act of
Assembly can change or alter it. All laws ar6 subordinate to this
supreme law, and must yield to it, as they are null and void when
they come in conflict with it. It follows, therefore, if the Legislature attempted in this charter to substitute any other compensation
for private property taken for this road, or directly or by indirection, deprived the citizen of that '4just compensation" in -whole or
in part, which is secured in the organic law,' it has transcended its
authority, and trespassed upon sacred ground. If it should be
our opinion that this has been done, it becomes our imperious duty,
delicate .and unpleasant as it may be, to sustain the Constitution
which we have sworn to support with a firm hand. That must
stand, no matter what else may fall. It must be guarded with
untiring and sleepless vigilance from all attacks. Upon the judiciary, this important duty devolves. The people can only look to
this department of the government for protection, when their constitutional rights are invaded.
It should'be a pleasant, though .delicate duty to those they have
thus entrusted with the power, to exert it on all proper occasions
for their security against wrong. Then -what is the power of the
State, and the rights of the citizen in the question now before us?
The former may take the private property of the latter for public
use, as has been done in ihis case. The citizen has a concomitant
right founded in the constitution" to a "just compensation." How
is this right to be asserted? It is certainly the duty of the government to provide some fair and proper mode of ascertaining the
value of the property taken, where- it cannot be agreed upon by
the parties, and to make provision also for the payment, when it is
ascertained in the mode and manner contemplated by the Constitution. The charter of the defendants was granted in 1845, Ch. 1.
The 24th section regulates the mode of ascertaining the damages
to individuals, and the manner of compensating them for lands
taken for the road. * It provides, when the land cannot be purchased, or-the price agreed upon, "the same may be taken at a
valuation to be made by five commissioners, or a majority of them,
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to be appointed by the Circuit Court of the county, where some
part of the land or right of way is situated," who shall take an
oath faithfully and impartially, to discharge the duty assigned them.
In making the said valuation, the said commissioners shall take into
consideration the loss or damage which may occur to the owner or
owners in consequence of the land being taken, or the right of way
surrendered, and also the benefit or advantage he may receive from
the erection or establishment of the said road or work, and shall
state particularly the nature and amount of each; and the excess of
loss or damages over and above the benefit and advantage, shall form
the measure of valuation of said land or right of way. The proceeding of said commissioners, accompanied with a full description
of said land or right of way, shall be returned under the hands and
seals of a majority to the Court from which the commission issued,
there to remain of record. Either party may appeal and have a
new valuation by a jury in Court, whose verdict shall be final, unless
a new trial is granted. "And the land or right of way so valued
by the commissioners or jury, shall vest in said company in fee
simple, so soon as the valuation may be paid, or where refused, may
be tendered." It is further provided, that an appeal is not to stop
the work, nor can the same be delayed by injunction or supersedeas.
But in case the appeal is by the company, surety must be given to
pay whatever may be awarded in the Court. Here is a full and
vigorous exercise of the power of eminent domain. The fee simple
title is vested in the corporation. No objection is made, nor do we
see any under the construction that a jury trial in the regular
common law mode is adopted in case of appeal, to the provision
made in this section for selling the rights of the parties. But the
contested and embarrassing questign still arises upon the rule
prescribed in this law, for ascertaining the "just compensation" to
the owner of the land, the use and title of which he is thus forced
to surrender to the corporation;- on the one hand in making the
valuation of the land, the "1loss or damages" which may accrue to
the owner by taking the land, is to be fixed; on the other hand, the
" benefit or advantage" to the owner from the erection of the road, is
to be estimated, and the excess of the former over the latter, in the
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language of the Act, "shall form the measure of valuation of said
land." Is this the measure of "compensation" prescribed in the
Constitution ? Was.the compensation secured to the owner for the
loss of his property, to be paid in moriey, or may it be made in
other property, or incidental "benefits and advantages"-was it
intended that the citizen should not only be forced to give up his
lands for the common or public use, but to take in payment for it,
anything it might suit the party taking it, to offer?
If-such be the true meaning of the Constitution, it is certainly a
poor protection of private rights against the exactions of power,,
and is only calculated to excite'half-hopes of security. By the
supreme law, the Legislature are empowered, when in their opinion
the good of the whole people requires it, and for the use and benefit
of the whole, to compel him who owns property to give it up, upon
the payment to hiln,- by the same public for whose use it is taken,
a "just compensation," or in otier'words a fair price, or the value
*in money for the property Aken. He cannot be paid off in "benefits or advantages," which are thus forced upon him against his
consent. He may be 'ompelled to submit to the'encroachment
upon his private rights' when they come thus in conflict with the
public interests; but with', tli6 charter of his liberty in his hand,
he can say to the powersi'tliat be, "thus far shalt thou come and
no farther." In the appropriation of the property, the public
power is exhausted. It cannot be allowed to prescribe hw much
and in what he shall 'be paid. The value of the thing taken must
be assessed by 9 just and proper tribunal, aind the amount paid in
the lawful coin of thle .United States-in money. It is a debt
against those who take the property, and must be paid like all other
debts. The creditor in this case, cannot be coerced to receive as
compenstion, -ameliorations of his 'remaining property, or the
enhancement of its value,- or 'any other "benefit or advantage,"
either real or imaginary, that may be conferred upon him.' He
may not wish to part with a portion of his land, to have the price
of that which remains; enhanced. The increase of price without
any improvement of its fertfit~y or beauty, is no advantage to him
if he does not wish to sell-it only increases his public burthens in
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the way of taxation; what others might regard as a great " advantage and benefit," he might consider a decided injury. If his
lands are appreciated, and his facilities of travel and trade increased
by this improvement, these are benefits to which he is entitled with
the community in general, and for which he has to pay in common
with others, in taxes and other burthens. But there can be no
good reason why any more should be taken from him than others,
for these common benefits. Here we arrive at the conclusion that
the plaintiff is entitled to the value of the land taken from him by
the defendants, in mony, and that this value, when ascertained,
cannot be liquidated in whole or in part, by any "benefit or advantage" he may in fact or by supposition derive from the making of
the road in the appreciation of his remaining land or otherwise. But
on the other hand, it would be unjust to make the public pay the
enhanced price that would result from the fact that the road had been
located at that place. It is difficult to lay down any very definite rule
for the government of commissioners and juries on this subject, iVhich
will be of easy practical application in every case, yet it is highly
important that some principle be settled, 'and the extent of its'
application to peculiar circumstances defined, calculated to produce
uniformity, and rid the subject of that vague and indefinite character which now seems to perplex the minds of those who have to act
upon it. We consider the proper rule to be this, that the fair cash
value of the land taken for public use, if the owner were willing to
sell, and the company desired to buy that particular quality, at
that place and in that form, would be the measure of compensation.
It is not in the nature of a wrongful taking for which damages
are to be assessed, nor is it a claim for any wrong or damage done;
but the appropriation of the property is legal and rightful, as much
so as if the owner had voluntarily sold it to the company, and the
only open question was, what is a fair price for the property, what
is its value ? Now, from this definition of the nature of the trinsaction, it will follow that there can be nothing added to the price on
account of the unwillingness of the owner to part with his land, or
to have the improvement there, or because he may have to build
fences and walls, or to be put to inconvenience in getting to his out-
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buildings, or have them to remove, or such like inconveniences.
These things do not enter into the idea of a just compensation for
the property actually taken, but are' incidental to it, and are provided for i another form, by this charter, as will be presently
shown. These considerations are not to enter into the estimate of
the jury to enhance the price, but on the other side, the value is
not to be reduced by the consideration that the improvement about
to be made will be advantageous to the owner in the amelioration
and enhanced value of his remaining land, the increased facility in
travel or trade it will afford him, or the location of a depot or a
town upon his land. To all these and such other incidental advantages as may result to him, he is entitled in common with other
citizens, and for which he pays in taxes and other legal burthens
imposed by government. If such special advantages accrue to him
in consequence of the public improvement, and that particular location of the road, it is-an incident to his right of property, and a
benefit for which no one has a right to make him account in fixing
the price of other property taken against his will. The following
circumstances and con.iderations should enter into this estimate of
value or compensation:
1. The quantity of land taken. It would not be reasonable to
fix the price of an acre-or the fourth of an acre at the general rate
of the whole tract or a larger quahtity. This would be selling by
retail, and ought to be at a higher price for the quantity taken.
2. The place where the land lies which is thus appropriated, with
reference'to external circumstances. Is it in the country, a village
or city? With reference to remaining land, is taken on the outer
line, with the bed of the road only on the land, or does it run so as
to divide the land in a regular or awkward form ?-through a garden ?-stable lot, or the family yard ?-between the dwelling house
and'kitchen ? or under either of them? and if so, are they of great
value, or of but little value? Is it so to run as to cut off from the
main lot a portion of ground that for quantity or form is saleable
or not? So, upon this point the rule must be as first laid down in
general terms, the quantity taken; and place and form in which it is
taken, must be looked to in fixing its value.
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8. Any general effect that the actual or contemplated construction of the railroad, or special effect of the location of it at that
particular .place may have upon the value of that land, whether it
has been to improve or lessen the price is not to form an element
or be considered in the valuation. If the value is elevated by the
work, he should not have the advantage of it, because we do not
make him account for the increased value of the remainder of his
land, and if the value is reduced by it he should not suffer, because
he is forced to part with his property for that purpose against his
will.
4. The incidental advantages and disadvantages, benefits and injuries are to be left entirely out of view. The owner's unwillingness to
sell, or to the location of the road on his land or near his house on the
one hand, and the necessity the public is under to have the land at
that particular place, on the other, are to have no influence on the
price; the property is to be valued on the same principle and considerations, as if both parties had agreed upon the sale, and had referred
the single question of the intrinsic value of that particular property
to the commissioners, the consideration of his property to. which the
owner is entitled being thus ascertained, it must be paid to him in
money. To compel him to take anything else, would render the
constitutional guarantee ineffectual and delusive. Here the constitutional provision ends, its inhibition upon the government goes no
further. The Legislature may make any regulations it thinks right
and proper for an account or estimate of incidental "loss or damage," or injuries to the land owner. These may consist of the
necessity created for building new fences, the removal of buildings,
separating him from his spring, well, mill, negro houses, barns, &c.
And against this may be set off the "benefits and advantages" to
the owner in the enhancement of the value of his remaining land.,
of the same or any adjoining tract, his increased facilities of travel,
&c. We think the Legislature have the power to do this, and if
required by the petitioner, the Court would be bound under this
charter to direct the commissioner, or in case of appeal, the jury,
to make the estimate on both sides, upon the basis here stated.
But this must be separate and distinct from the valuation of the
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land for the purpose of ascertaining the compensation required by
the constitution, and cannot be blended with it, nor in any way
enlarge or reduce it. It is true that the nature of the items on both
sides of this account would be of a very vague and indefinite character, depending before commissioners upon their opinions upon the
view and examination of the ground, and before a jury, on appeal,
upon the opinions and fancies of witnesses. But for that no remedy
or definite rule can be furnished which will clear the subject of its
inherent difficulties. But this enchancement of price which may be
taken into the account against the petitioner must be confirmed in
the estimate to the lot or tract through which the road runs, or to
the lots or lands which adjoin it, and to such improvement in value
as 'is the result of running the road at that particular place, and
not to the general use of property in the county or that neighborhood produced by the public work.
That which is common t6 all, should not be charged to him,
because this is an advantage.to which he is entitled as a citizen and
tax payer of the State.
To these conclusions we are brought by what seems to us a fair
construction of our own constitution. And we find that we are
fully sustained in them by the Court of Appeals of the State of
Kentucky, in the case of Jacob vs. The City of Louisville, 9 Dana,
114. In that case it is stated that the same principles had been
adopted in Sutton's Beirs vs. The City of Lonuisville, 5 Dana, 28,
and in Bice vs. The Nicholasville, -Danville and Lancaster Turnpike Company, 7 Dana, 81. The language used in the Constitution of Kentucky is substantially the same as ours on this subject.
We are aware that in some of the States contrary and conflicting
views have been entertained on some of the points now decided.
It would be a useless extension of this opinion to review them, as it
could be productive of no advantage. The diversity presented may
be partly attributed to the different constitutional provisions on the
subject, and to the fact that some of the state constitutions are
entirely without any- such provisions. And again, the legislative
enactments, and the. form in which the questions have been presented to the Court, were so variant and dissimilar, that the diver-

